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On the Complexity of Sequential Incentive Design
Yagiz Savas?, Vijay Gupta, and Ufuk Topcu
Abstract—In many scenarios, a principal dynamically interacts
with an agent and offers a sequence of incentives to align the
agent’s behavior with a desired objective. This paper focuses
on the problem of synthesizing an incentive sequence that, once
offered, induces the desired agent behavior even when the agent’s
intrinsic motivation is unknown to the principal. We model
the agent’s behavior as a Markov decision process, express its
intrinsic motivation as a reward function, which belongs to a
finite set of possible reward functions, and consider the incentives
as additional rewards offered to the agent. We first show that
the behavior modification problem (BMP), i.e., the problem of
synthesizing an incentive sequence that induces a desired agent
behavior at minimum total cost to the principal, is PSPACE-hard.
Moreover, we show that by imposing certain restrictions on the
incentive sequences available to the principal, one can obtain two
NP-complete variants of the BMP. We also provide a sufficient
condition on the set of possible reward functions under which the
BMP can be solved via linear programming. Finally, we propose
two algorithms to compute globally and locally optimal solutions
to the NP-complete variants of the BMP.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a scenario in which a principal offers a sequence of
incentives to influence the behavior of an agent with unknown
intrinsic motivation. For example, when an online retailer
(principal) interacts with a customer (agent), the retailer may
aim to convince the customer to purchase a number of products
over time by offering a sequence of discounts (incentives). The
customer’s willingness to purchase new products may depend
on the ones purchased in the past, e.g., willingness to purchase
a video game depends on whether the customer already owns
a game console. Moreover, the retailer typically does not
know what discount rates will encourage the customer to shop
more. In this paper, we study the problem of synthesizing
an incentive sequence that, once offered, induces the desired
agent behavior regardless of the agent’s intrinsic motivation
while minimizing the worst-case total cost to the principal.
The design of incentives that align an agent’s behavior
with a principal’s objective is a classical problem that has
been studied from the perspective of control theory [1], game
theory [2], contract theory [3], and mechanism design [4]
under various assumptions on related problem parameters.
Despite the long history, to the best of our knowledge, there
are only a few studies, e.g., [5]–[7], that analyze the computa-
tional complexity of incentive design problems. Such analyses
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are crucial to understand the computational challenges that
naturally arise in incentive design problems and to develop
effective algorithms for the synthesis of incentives. Here, we
present a comprehensive complexity analysis of a particular
class of sequential incentive design problems and propose
several algorithms to solve them.
We model the agent’s behavior as a Markov decision process
(MDP) [8]. MDPs model sequential decision-making under
uncertainty and have been used to build recommendation
systems [9], to develop sales promotion strategies [10], and
to design autonomous driving algorithms [11]. By modelling
the agent’s behavior as an MDP, one can represent uncertain
outcomes of the agent’s actions. For instance, when a retailer
makes a discount offer for purchases exceeding a certain
amount, the actual amount the agent will spend upon accepting
the offer can be expressed through a probability distribution.
We express the agent’s intrinsic motivation as a reward
function and consider the incentives as additional nonnegative
rewards offered for the agent’s actions. Similar to the classical
adverse selection problem [3], we assume that the agent’s
reward function is a private information and the principal only
knows that the agent’s reward function belongs to a finite set of
possible reward functions. The finite set assumption is standard
in incentive design literature [12]; using certain techniques,
e.g., clustering [13], the principal may infer from historical
data that agents can be categorized into a finite number of types
each of which is associated with a certain reward function.
We consider a principal whose objective is to lead the agent
to a desired set of target states in the MDP with maximum
probability while minimizing its worst-case expected total cost
to induce such a behavior. In the considered setting, the worst-
case scenario corresponds to a principal that interacts with
an agent type that maximizes the incurred total cost over
all possible agent types. The target set may represent, for
example, the collection of products purchased by the customer.
Then, the principal’s objective corresponds to maximizing its
profit while guaranteeing that the agent purchases the desired
group of products regardless of its type.
This paper has four main contributions. First, we show that
the behavior modification problem (BMP), i.e., the problem
of synthesizing an incentive sequence that leads the agent to
a desired target set with maximum probability while mini-
mizing the worst-case total cost to the principal, is PSPACE-
hard. Second, we show that by preventing the principal from
adapting its incentive offers in time according to its history
of interactions with the agent, one can obtain two “easier”
variants of the BMP which are NP-complete. Third, we show
that, when the set of possible agent types contains a type
that always demands an incentive offer that is higher than
the ones demanded by any other type, the resulting BMP can
be solved in polynomial-time via linear programming. Finally,
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we present two algorithms to solve the NP-complete variants
of the BMP. The first algorithm computes a globally optimal
solution to the considered problems based on a mixed-integer
linear program. The second algorithm, on the other hand,
computes a locally optimal solution by resorting to a variation
[14] of the so-called convex-concave procedure [15] to solve
a nonlinear optimization problem with bilinear constraints.
Related Work: Some of the results presented in Section VII of
this paper has previously appeared in [16] where we study a
sequential incentive design problem in which the agent has
a known intrinsic motivation. In this paper, we present an
extensive study of the sequential incentive design problem for
agents with unknown intrinsic motivation, which is a signif-
icantly different problem. In particular, we show that, when
the agent’s intrinsic motivation is unknown to the principal, it
is, in general, PSPACE-hard to synthesize an optimal incentive
sequence that induces the desired behavior. On the other hand,
for an agent with known intrinsic motivation, an optimal
incentive sequence can be synthesized in polynomial-time.
MDPs have been recently used to study the synthesis
of sequential incentive offers in [7], [17]–[19]. In [7], the
authors consider a principal with a limited budget who aims
to induce an agent behavior that maximizes the principal’s
utility. Similarly, in [18], a principal with a limited budget
who aims to induce a specific agent policy through incentive
offers is considered. In [17], the authors consider a multi-
armed bandit setting in which a principal sequentially offers
incentives to an agent with the objective of modifying its
behavior. The paper [19] studies an online mechanism design
problem in which a principal interacts with multiple agents
and aims to maximize the expected social utility. Unlike the
above mentioned studies, in this paper, we consider a principal
with no budget constraints that aims to modify the behavior
of a single agent at minimum worst-case total cost.
There are only a few results in the literature on the
complexity of incentive design problems. In [7], the authors
consider a principal with budget constraints and prove, by
a reduction from the Knapsack problem, that the considered
problem is NP-hard even when the agent’s reward function
is known to the principal. Since we consider a principal
with no budget constraints, the reduction techniques employed
here are significantly different from the one used in [7]. In
[6], a number of NP-hardness results are presented for static
Stackelberg game settings in which the principal interacts with
the agent only once. In [5], the authors prove the complexity of
several mechanism design problems in which the principal is
allowed to condition its incentive offers on agent types. Even
though the reduction techniques used in the above mentioned
references are quite insightful, they cannot be applied to prove
the complexity of the BMP which concerns a sequential setting
in which the incentives are not conditioned on the agent types.
The complexity results presented in this paper are also
closely related to the complexity of synthesizing optimal
policies in robust MDPs with unstructured uncertainty sets
[20], multi-model MDPs [21], and partially observable MDPs
[22]. In particular, the policy synthesis problems for all these
models are PSPACE-hard. The main difference of the reduc-
tion technique we use in this paper from the ones used in the
above mentioned references is the construction of the reward
functions for each agent type.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Notation: For a set S, we denote its cardinality by |S|. Ad-
ditionally, N:={1, 2, . . .}, R:=(−∞,∞), and R≥0:=[0,∞).
A. Markov decision processes
Definition 1: A Markov decision process (MDP) is a tuple
M:=(S, s1,A,P) where S is a finite set of states, s1∈S is an
initial state, A is a finite set of actions, and P:S×A×S→[0, 1]
is a transition function such that
∑
s′∈S P(s, a, s′)=1 for all
s∈S and a∈A.
We denote the transition probability P(s, a, s′) by Ps,a,s′ ,
and the set of available actions in s∈S by A(s). A state s∈S is
absorbing if Ps,a,s=1 for all a∈A(s). The size of an MDP is
the number of triplets (s, a, s′)∈S×A×S such that Ps,a,s′>0.
Definition 2: For an MDP M, a policy is a sequence
pi:=(d1, d2, d3, . . .) where each dt:S→A is a decision rule
such that dt(s)∈A(s) for all s∈S. A stationary policy is of
the form pi=(d, d, d, . . .). We denote the set of all policies and
all stationary policies by Π(M) and ΠS(M), respectively.
We denote the action a∈A(s) taken by the agent in a state
s∈S under a stationary policy pi by pi(s).
B. Incentive sequences
For an MDP M, an information sequence It describes the
information available to the principal at stage t∈N and is
recursively defined as follows. At the first stage, an informa-
tion sequence comprises only of the agent’s current state, e.g.,
I1=(s1). The principal makes incentive offers δ1(I1, a) to the
agent for some actions, the agent takes an action a1∈A(s1)
and transitions to a state s2∈S. At the second stage, the infor-
mation sequence becomes I2=(s1, γ1, a1, s2). The principal
makes incentive offers δ2(I2, a) to the agent for some actions,
the agent takes an action a2∈A(s2) and transitions to a state
s3∈S. The information sequence at stage t∈N is then recur-
sively defined as It=(s1, γ1, a1, s2, . . . , st−1, γt−1, at−1, st).
We denote by It the set of all possible information sequences
available to the principal at stage t∈N.
Definition 3: For an MDP M, an incentive sequence is a se-
quence γ:=(δ1, δ2, δ3, . . .) of incentive offers δt:It×A→R≥0.
A stationary incentive sequence is of the form γ=(δ, δ, δ, . . .)
where δ:S×A→R≥0. A stationary deterministic incentive se-
quence is a stationary incentive sequence such that for all s∈S,∑
a′∈A(s) δ(s, a
′)=δ(s, a) for some a∈A(s). For an MDPM,
we denote the set of all incentive sequences, all stationary
incentive sequences, and all stationary deterministic incentive
sequences by Γ(M), ΓS(M), and ΓSD(M), respectively.
For a stationary incentive sequence γ∈ΓS(M), we denote
the incentive offer for a state-action pair (s, a) by γ(s, a).
C. Reachability
An infinite sequence %pi=s1s2s3 . . . of states generated in
M under a policy pi, which starts from the initial state s1 and
satisfies Pst,dt(st),st+1>0 for all t∈N, is called a path. We
define the set of all paths in M generated under the policy
pi by PathspiM. We use the standard probability measure over
the outcome set PathspiM [23]. Let %
pi[t]:=st denote the state
visited at the t-th stage along the path %pi . We define
PrpiM(Reach[B]) := Pr{%pi ∈ PathspiM : ∃t ∈ N, %pi[t] ∈ B}
as the probability with which the paths generated inM under
pi reaches the set B⊆S. We denote the maximum probability
of reaching the set B under any policy pi∈Π(M) by
Rmax(M, B) := max
pi∈Π(M)
PrpiM(Reach[B]).
The existence of maximum in the above definition follows
from Lemma 10.102 in [23], and the value of Rmax(M, B)
can be computed via linear programming [23, Chapter 10].
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider an agent whose behavior is modeled as an
MDP M and a principal that provides a sequence γ∈Γ(M)
of incentives to the agent in order to induce a desired behavior.
We assume that the agent’s intrinsic motivation is unknown
to the principal, but it can be expressed by one of finitely many
reward functions. Formally, let Θ be a finite set of agent types,
and for each θ∈Θ, Rθ:S×A→R be the associated reward
function. The principal knows the function Rθ associated with
each type θ∈Θ, but does not know the true agent type θ?∈Θ.
The sequence of interactions between the principal and
the agent is as follows. At stage t∈N, the agent occupies a
state st∈S. The information sequence It, defined in Section
II-B, describes the information available to the principal about
the agent. The principal offers an incentive δt(It, a) to the
agent for each action a∈A, and the agent chooses an action
at∈A(st) to maximize its immediate total reward, i.e.,
at ∈ arg max
a∈A(st)
[
Rθ?(st, a) + δt(It, a)
]
. (1)
Depending on the action taken by the agent, the principal pays
δt(It, at) to the agent. Finally, the agent transitions to the next
state st+1∈S with probability Pst,at,st+1 , the principal updates
its information sequence to It+1=(It, δt, at, st+1), and so on.
The principal offers a sequence of incentives to the agent so
that the agent reaches a target state with maximum probability
regardless of its type and the worst-case expected total cost of
inducing the desired behavior to the principal is minimized.
Problem 1: (Behavior modification problem (BMP)) For
an MDP M, a set B⊆S of absorbing target states, and a set
Θ of possible agent types, synthesize an incentive sequence
γ∈Γ(M) that leads the agent to a target state with maximum
probability while minimizing the expected total cost, i.e.,
minimize
γ∈Γ(M)
max
θ∈Θ
Epi
?
[ ∞∑
t=1
δt(It, At)
∣∣∣θ] (2a)
subject to: pi? = (d?1, d
?
2, d
?
3, . . .) (2b)
∀t ∈ N,∀s ∈ S, d?t (s) ∈ arg max
a∈A(s)
[
Rθ(s, a) + δt(It, a)
]
(2c)
Prpi
?
M(Reach[B]) = Rmax(M, B). (2d)
The expectation in (2a) is taken over the paths that are
induced by the policy pi?, i.e., the principal pays the offered
incentive if and only if the agent takes the incentivized action.
Remark 1: The decision-making model (1) describes a myopic
agent which aims to maximize only its immediate rewards.
Clearly, this model is restrictive in terms of its capability of
explaining sophisticated agent behaviors. The main reason that
we use such a simple model is to avoid notational burden that
comes with more expressive alternatives. In Appendix A, we
show that the behavior modification of an agent with a finite
decision horizon is computationally not easier than the be-
havior modification of a myopic agent. We also show how the
solution techniques developed for the behavior modification
of a myopic agent can be utilized to modify the behavior of
an agent with a finite decision horizon.
Remark 2: The BMP requires all target states s∈B to be
absorbing. We impose such a restriction just to avoid the
additional definitions and notations required to consider non-
absorbing target states. In Appendix A, we show how the
results presented in this paper can be applied to MDPs with
non-absorbing target states.
Remark 3: The BMP inherently assumes that the principal
knows the transition function P of the given MDP M. It is
clear that, by allowing P to belong to an uncertainty set, one
cannot obtain a computationally easier problem.
IV. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
In this section, we provide a brief summary of the presented
results. We keep the exposition non-technical to improve
readability; precise statements are provided in later sections.
Table I illustrates an overview of the considered problems,
their complexity, and the proposed solution techniques.
We first show that the BMP is PSPACE-hard. That is, unless
P=PSPACE, an event considered to be less likely than the event
P=NP [22], an efficient algorithm to solve the BMP does not
exist. Due to this discouraging result, instead of studying the
BMP in its most generality, we focus on its variants in which
we restrict the incentive sequences available to the principal.
As the first restriction, we allow the principal to use only
stationary incentive sequences to modify the agent’s behavior
and refer to the resulting problem as the non-adaptive behavior
modification problem (N-BMP). We show that the decision
problem associated with the N-BMP is NP-complete even
when the given MDP has only deterministic transitions. To
find a globally optimal solution to the N-BMP, we formulate
a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) in which the integer
variables correspond to actions taken by different agent types
in a given state. We also show that the N-BMP can be
formulated as a nonlinear optimization problem with bilin-
ear constraints for which a locally optimal solution can be
obtained using the so-called convex-concave procedure [14].
As the second restriction, we allow the principal to use
only stationary deterministic incentive sequences to modify
the agent’s behavior and refer to the resulting problem as
the non-adaptive single-action behavior modification problem
(NS-BMP). We prove that the decision problem associated with
the NS-BMP is NP-complete even when the agent has state-
independent reward functions. We also show that globally and
TABLE I: A summary of the presented results.
Problem Complexity Globally optimal solution Locally optimal solution
Behavior modification (BMP) PSPACE-hard — —
Non-adaptive behavior modification (N-BMP) NP-complete MILP Convex-concave procedure
Non-adaptive single-action behavior modification (NS-BMP) NP-complete MILP Convex-concave procedure
Behavior modification of a dominant type (BMP-D) P LP —
locally optimal solutions to the NS-BMP can be computed by
slightly modifying the methods developed to solve the N-BMP.
Finally, we consider the case in which the set of agent types
include a dominant type which always demands the principal
to offer an incentive amount that is higher than the ones
demanded by any other agent type. We prove that solving the
BMP instances that involve a dominant type is equivalent to
modifying the behavior of the dominant type. We show that
the behavior modification problem of a dominant type (BMP-
D) is in P, and present an approach based on a linear program
(LP) to solve the BMP-D.
V. OPTIMAL AGENT BEHAVIOR AND OPTIMAL INCENTIVE
SEQUENCES
In the BMP, we aim to synthesize an incentive sequence that
induces an optimal agent policy that reaches a target set with
maximum probability while minimizing the expected total cost
to the principal. To obtain a well-defined BMP, in this section,
we first precisely specify how the agent behaves when there
are multiple optimal policies. We then show that, in general,
an incentive sequence that minimizes the expected total cost
to the principal may not exist. Hence, we focus on -optimal
incentive sequences where >0 is an arbitrarily small constant.
A. Agent’s behavior when multiple optimal policies exist
For a given incentive sequence, the agent’s optimal policy
may not be unique. In the presence of multiple optimal poli-
cies, there are only two possible cases: either (i) there exists
an optimal policy that violates the reachability constraint in
(2d) or (ii) all optimal policies satisfy the constraint in (2d).
We first analyze case (i). Consider the MDP given in Fig. 1
(left). Let the agent’s reward function be Rθ?(s1, a1)=0 and
Rθ?(s1, a2)=−1. That is, in the absence of incentives, it is
optimal for the agent to stay in state s1 under action a1.
Suppose that the principal offers the stationary incentives
γ(s1, a1)=0 and γ(s1, a2)=1 to the agent. Then, we have
{a1, a2} = arg max
a∈A(s1)
[
Rθ?(s1, a) + γ(s1, a)
]
which implies that the agent has multiple optimal policies.
Note that under the optimal stationary policy pi(s1)=a2, the
agent reaches the target state s2 with probability 1, whereas
under the optimal stationary policy pi(s1)=a1, it reaches the
target state s2 with probability 0. We assume that, in such a
scenario, the agent behaves adversarially against the principal.
Assumption: Under the provided incentive sequence, if there
exists an optimal policy following which the agent can violate
the constraint in (2d), then the agent follows such a policy.
s1 s2
a1, 0
a2,−1
s1 s2
a1, 0
a2,−1
a3,−1
Fig. 1: MDP examples to illustrate the agent’s behavior in the
existence of multiple optimal policies. Solid lines represent
deterministic transitions; dashed lines represent transitions
with equal probability. The initial state is s1. The type set Θ
satisfies |Θ|=1, i.e., the principal knows the true agent type.
The target set is B={s2}. The tuples (a, r) next to the arrows
indicate the action a and the reward r.
We now analyze case (ii). Consider the MDP given in Fig.
1 (right). In this MDP, in addition to the actions a1 and a2, the
agent can take a third action a3 which leads the agent to the
states s1 and s2 with equal probability. Let the reward function
be Rθ?(s1, a1)=0, Rθ?(s1, a2)=−1, and Rθ?(s1, a3)=−1.
Suppose that the principal offers the stationary incentives
γ(s1, a1)=0, γ(s1, a2)=2, and γ(s1, a3)=2. Then, we have
{a2, a3} = arg max
a∈A(s1)
[
Rθ?(s1, a) + γ(s1, a)
]
,
and the agent has multiple optimal policies. Under all its
optimal policies, the agent reaches the target state s2 with
probability 1. However, if the agent follows the stationary
policy pi(s1)=a2, the expected total cost to the principal is
equal to 2, whereas the stationary policy pi(s1)=a3 incurs the
expected total cost of 4. In such a scenario, we again assume
that the agent behaves adversarially against the principal.
Assumption: Under the provided incentive sequence, if all
optimal agent policies satisfy the constraint in (2d), then the
agent follows the policy that maximizes the expected total cost
to the principal.
B. Non-existence of optimal incentive sequences
We now illustrate with an example that, in general, there
may exist no incentive sequence γ∈Γ(M) that attains the
minimum in (2a)-(2d). Consider again the MDP given in Fig. 1
(left). In this example, without loss of generality, we can focus
on stationary incentive sequences to minimize the expected
total cost to the principal. The feasible set of stationary
incentive sequences is described by the set
{γ(s, a) ≥ 0 | γ(s1, a2)− γ(s1, a1) ≥ 1 + ˜, ˜ > 0}
which is not a compact set due to the condition ˜>0. The
incentive offers satisfying γ(s1, a2)−γ(s1, a1)=1, i.e., ˜=0,
do not belong to the feasible set because under such incentive
sequences the agent adversarially follows the stationary policy
pi(s1)=a1 which violates the constraint in (2d).
Motivated by the above example, in the rest of the paper,
we focus on obtaining an -optimal solution to the BMP.
Definition 4: Let D be a non-empty set, h:D→R≥0 be a
function, and >0 be a constant. A point x∈D is said to be
an -optimal solution to the problem minx∈D h(x) if
h(x) ≤ min
x∈D
h(x) + .
VI. COMPLEXITY OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION
In this section, we present the results on the computational
complexity of the BMP and its two variants. Before proceeding
with the complexity results, we first show that a feasible
solution to the BMP can be computed efficiently.
A. A feasible solution to the behavior modification problem
Let C:S×A→R≥0 be defined as
C(s, a) := max
θ∈Θ
(
max
a′∈A(s)
Rθ(s, a′)−Rθ(s, a) + 
)
. (3)
The value of C(s, a) denotes an incentive amount under which
the agent takes the incentivized action a∈A(s) in state s∈S
regardless of its type. To see this, note that the term inside
the parentheses denotes an amount that, once offered, makes
the action a∈A(s) uniquely optimal for the agent type θ∈Θ.
Hence, by taking the maximum over all agent types, we ensure
that, under the stationary incentive offer γ(s, a)=C(s, a), the
agent takes the action a∈A(s) regardless of its type.
We can obtain a feasible solution to the BMP as follows.
First, compute a policy pi?∈Π(M) that reaches the desired
target set B with maximum probability Rmax(M, B) by
solving a linear program [23, Chapter 10]. Then, offer the
stationary incentive sequence
γ(s, a) =
{
C(s, a) if pi?(s) = a
0 otherwise
(4)
to the agent. Under the above incentive sequence, the agent
follows the desired policy pi? regardless of its type; hence, it
reaches the target set B with maximum probability.
There are two important aspects of the incentive sequence
synthesized above. First, it is computed in time polynomial in
the size of M and Θ. Second, it conservatively incentivizes
the same actions for all agent types ignoring the principal’s
knowledge on the reward functions Rθ. In the next section,
we show that, in order to exploit the principal’s knowledge on
the reward functions and minimize the incurred total cost, one
should solve a more challenging computational problem.
B. Complexity results
We first present a discouraging result which shows that,
unless P=PSPACE, solving the BMP in time polynomial in
the size of M and Θ is not possible.
Theorem 1: For N∈N, deciding whether there exists a feasible
solution to the BMP with the objective value less than or equal
to N is PSPACE-hard.
We provide a proof for the above result in Appendix B
where we show that the PSPACE-complete quantified satisfi-
ability problem (QSAT) [24] can be reduced to the BAP. The
reduction closely follows the reduction of QSAT to partially
observable MDP problems [22] in which the objective is to
synthesize an observation-based controller to maximize the
expected total reward collected by an agent.
Next, we introduce two variants of the BMP in which the
principal is allowed to use only a subset of the set Γ(M) of
all incentive sequences.
Definition 5: When the principal is restricted to use stationary
incentive sequences, i.e., the minimization in (2a) is performed
over the set ΓS(M), the resulting BMP is referred to as the
non-adaptive BMP (N-BMP).
In N-BMP, the principal does not utilize its past experiences,
i.e., information sequence It, with the agent to refine the
incentive offers in the future. Therefore, in a sense, the N-BMP
describes an offline incentive design problem. The following
result shows that the N-BMP is computationally “easier” than
the BMP. However, it is still not likely to be solved efficiently
even for MDPs with deterministic transition functions.
Theorem 2: For N∈N, deciding whether there exists a feasible
solution to the N-BMP with the objective value less than or
equal to N is NP-complete even when the transition function
P satisfies Ps,a,s′∈{0, 1} for all s, s′∈S and all a∈A.
A proof for the above result is provided in Appendix B
where we reduce the NP-complete Euclidean path traveling
salesman problem [25] to the N-BMP. The reduction demon-
strates that, to lead the agent to a target state at minimum total
cost, the principal may need to reveal the agent’s true type.
Definition 6: When the principal is restricted to use stationary
deterministic incentive sequences, i.e., minimization in (2a) is
performed over the set ΓSD(M), the resulting BMP is referred
to as the non-adaptive single-action BMP (NS-BMP).
In NS-BMP, the principal offers incentives only for a single
action in a given state. Such a restriction can be encountered in
practice, for example, when a retailer offers discounts only for
the purchases that exceed a certain total sum. The following
result shows that the NS-BMP is a challenging problem even
when the agent has a state-independent reward function.
Theorem 3: For N∈N, deciding whether there exists a feasible
solution to the NS-BMP with the objective value less than or
equal to N is NP-complete even when Rθ(s, a)=Rθ(t, a) for
all s, t∈S, all a∈A, and all θ∈Θ.
A proof for the above result is provided in Appendix B
where we reduce the NP-complete set cover problem [22] to
the NS-BMP. The main idea in the reduction is that, to lead
the agent to a target state, the principal may need to reveal the
true agent type by the end of a fixed number of stages.
VII. A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR POLYNOMIAL-TIME
SOLVABILITY
In this section, we derive a sufficient condition on the
structure of the type set Θ under which the BMP can be solved
by assuming that the true agent type is known to the principal.
We define the BMP of a dominant type (BMP-D) as the BMP
instances that satisfy the derived sufficient condition and show
that an -optimal solution to the BMP-D can be computed in
time polynomial in the size of M and Θ.
A. Behavior modification of a dominant type: formulation
Let f :Γ(M)×Θ→R be a function such that
f(γ, θ) := Epi
?
[ ∞∑
t=1
δt(It, At)
∣∣∣θ] (5)
is the expected total cost incurred by the principal when the
sequence of incentive offers is γ∈Γ(M) and the agent type
is θ∈Θ. In (5), pi?∈Π(M) is the agent’s optimal policy under
the incentive sequence γ. Moreover, let ΓR,θ(M)⊆Γ(M) be
the set of incentive sequences under which the agent type
θ∈Θ reaches the target set B⊆S with maximum probability.
Precisely, we have γ∈ΓR,θ(M) if and only if the optimal
policy pi? of the agent type θ under the sequence γ∈Γ(M)
satisfies the equality in (2d). Finally, let
ΓR,Θ(M) :=
⋂
θ∈Θ
ΓR,θ(M) (6)
be the set of incentive sequences under which the agent reaches
the target set with maximum probability regardless of its type.
Then, the BMP in (2a)-(2d) can equivalently be written as
min
γ∈ΓR,Θ(M)
max
θ∈Θ
f(γ, θ). (7)
Using weak duality [26], together with the fact that
ΓR,Θ⊆ΓR,θ for all θ∈Θ, we have
min
γ∈ΓR,Θ(M)
max
θ∈Θ
f(γ, θ) ≥ max
θ∈Θ
min
γ∈ΓR,θ(M)
f(γ, θ). (8)
The above inequality implies that a principal that knows the
true agent type θ? can always modify the agent’s behavior at an
expected total cost that is less than or equal to the worst-case
expected total cost incurred by a principal that does not know
the true agent type. We now provide a sufficient condition
under which the knowledge of the true agent type θ? does not
help the principal to strictly decrease its expected total cost,
i.e., the inequality in (8) becomes an equality. For each θ∈Θ
and s∈S, let Rmaxθ (s):=maxa′∈A(s)Rθ(s, a′).
Theorem 4: For a given MDP M and a type set Θ, if there
exists θd∈Θ such that,
Rmaxθd (s)−Rθd(s, a) ≥ Rmaxθ (s)−Rθ(s, a) (9)
for all θ∈Θ, s∈S, and a∈A, then ΓR,θd(M)=ΓR,Θ(M) and
min
γ∈ΓR,Θ(M)
max
θ∈Θ
f(γ, θ) = min
γ∈ΓR,θd (M)
f(γ, θd).
Definition 7: When there exists a dominant type θd∈Θ that
satisfies the condition in (9), the resulting BMP is referred to
as the BMP of a dominant type (BMP-D).
Theorem 4 implies that one can solve the BMP instances
that satisfy the condition in (9) by assuming that the true agent
type θ? is the type θd. Hence, solving the BMP-D is equivalent
to finding an incentive sequence γ?∈Γ(M) such that
γ? ∈ arg min
γ∈ΓR,θd (M)
f(γ, θd). (10)
B. Behavior modification of a dominant type: reformulation
In general, the minimum in (10) is not attainable by any
feasible incentive sequence. Hence, we aim to find an -
optimal solution as defined as in Section V-B. In this section,
we show that finding an -optimal solution to the BMP-D is
equivalent to solving a certain constrained MDP problem.
For a given MDP M, we first partition the set S of states
into three disjoint sets as follows. Let B⊆S be the set of target
states and S0⊆S be the set of states that have zero probability
of reaching the states in B under any policy. Finally, we let
Sr=S\B ∪ S0. These sets can be found in time polynomial
in the size of the MDP using graph search algorithms [23].
For ≥0, let φ:S×A→R≥0 be the cost of control function
φ(s, a) :=
{
Rmaxθd (s)−Rθd(s, a) +  if s ∈ Sr, a ∈ A(s)
0 otherwise.
Additionally, let ΠR,θd(M) be the set of policies under which
the dominant agent type θd reaches the target set B with
maximum probability, i.e., pi′∈ΠR,θd(M) if and only if
Prpi
′
M(Reach[B]) = Rmax(M, B).
For any incentive sequence γ∈Γ(M), there exists a cor-
responding optimal policy pi∈Π(M) for the agent type
θd. Moreover, for the principal to induce an agent policy
pi=(d1, d2, . . .) such that pi∈ΠR,θd(M), it is necessary that,
for any information sequence It=(s1, γ1, a1, . . . , st), we have
δt(It, a)≥φ0(st, a) if dt(st)=a. Otherwise, we have
Rθd(st, a) + δt(It, a) < Rmaxθd (st),
which implies that the action a∈A(st) cannot be optimal for
the agent in state st∈S at stage t∈N. Let g:Π(M)→R≥0 be
the expected total cost of control function
g(pi) := Epi
[ ∞∑
t=1
φ(St, At)
∣∣∣θd] (11)
where the expectation is taken over the paths induced by
the dominant agent type’s policy pi. The necessary condition
described above implies that we have
min
γ∈ΓR,θd (M)
f(γ, θd) ≥ min
pi∈ΠR,θd (M)
g0(pi). (12)
Similarly, for the principal to induce an agent policy
pi=(d1, d2, . . .) such that pi∈ΠR,θd(M), it is sufficient that,
for any information sequence It=(s1, γ1, a1, . . . , st) where
st∈Sr, we have δt(It, a)=φ(st, a) for some >0 if dt(st)=a.
This follows from the fact that, if δt(It, a)=φ(st, a), then
Rθd(st, a) + δt(It, a) = Rmaxθd (st) +  > Rθd(st, a′)
for all a′∈A(s)\{a}. Hence, the action a∈A(st) is uniquely
optimal for the agent in state st∈Sr at stage t∈N. The
sufficient condition described above implies that, for any >0,
min
pi∈ΠR,θd (M)
g(pi) ≥ min
γ∈ΓR,θd (M)
f(γ, θd). (13)
We now show that finding an -optimal solution to the BMP-
D is equivalent to solving the optimization problem on the left
hand side of (13) for some >0. Let ΠSR,θd(M)⊆ΠR,θd(M)
be the set of stationary policies under which the dominant
agent type θd reaches the target set with maximum probability.
Lemma 1: [27] For any ≥0,
min
pi∈ΠR,θd (M)
g(pi) = min
pi∈ΠSR,θd (M)
g(pi). (14)
The above result, which is proven in [27], implies that
stationary policies are sufficient to minimize the expected total
cost function (11) subject to the reachability constraint in (2d).
Theorem 5: For any given >0, there exists >0 such that
min
pi∈ΠSR,θd (M)
g(pi) ≤ min
pi∈ΠSR,θd (M)
g0(pi) + . (15)
A proof of the above result and the explicit form of the
constant  in terms of  can be found in [16]. The above result,
together with (12) and (13), implies that one can find an -
optimal solution to the BMP-D in two steps as follows. First,
solve the optimization problem on the left hand side of (13)
for the corresponding >0. Let pi?∈ΠSR,θd(M) be the optimal
stationary policy which exists by Lemma 1. Second, provide
the agent the stationary incentive sequence
γ(s, a) =
{
φ(s, a) if pi?(s) = a,
0 otherwise.
(16)
C. Behavior modification of a dominant type: an algorithm
In the previous section, we showed that to find an -optimal
solution to the BMP-D, one can compute a stationary policy
pi? ∈ min
pi∈ΠSR,θd (M)
g(pi) (17)
and provide the agent the incentive sequence given in (16). In
this section, we present an algorithm that solves the problem
in (17) in time polynomial in the size of M.
The optimization problem in (17) is an instance of the so-
called constrained MDP problem in which the objective is to
synthesize a policy that maximizes the expected total reward
while ensuring that the expected total cost is below a certain
threshold [28]. It is known that, in general, deterministic poli-
cies pi∈ΠR,θd(M) are not sufficient to solve the constrained
MDP problem [28]. However, in what follows, we show that
the problem in (17) indeed admits an optimal solution in the
set of stationary deterministic policies.
Let r:S×A→R≥0 be a function such that
r(s, a) :=
{∑
s′∈B Ps,a,s′ if s ∈ Sr
0 otherwise.
(18)
By Theorem 10.100 in [23], for any pi∈Π(M), we have
Epi
[ ∞∑
t=1
r(St,At)
]
= PrpiM(Reach[B]).
Hence, the problem in (17) can be equivalently written as
min
pi∈ΠS(M)
Epi
[ ∞∑
t=1
φ(St,At)
]
(19a)
subject to: Epi
[ ∞∑
t=1
r(St,At)
]
= Rmax(M, B). (19b)
We synthesize an optimal stationary policy pi?∈ΠS(M)
that solves the problem in (19a)-(19b) by solving two linear
programs (LPs). First, we solve the LP
minimize
x(s,a)
∑
s∈Sr
∑
a∈A
x(s, a)φ(s, a) (20a)
subject to:
∑
s∈Sr
∑
a∈A
x(s, a)r(s, a) = Rmax(M, B) (20b)
∀s ∈ Sr,
∑
a∈A(s)
x(s, a)−
∑
s′∈Sr
∑
a∈A(s)
Ps′,a,sx(s′, a) = α(s)
(20c)
∀s ∈ Sr, a ∈ A(s′), x(s, a) ≥ 0 (20d)
where α:S→{0, 1} is a function such that α(s1)=1 and
α(s)=0 for all s∈S\{s1}, i.e., the initial state distribution.
The variable x(s, a) corresponds to the expected residence
time in the state-action pair (s, a) [8], [29]. The constraint
in (20b) ensures that the probability of reaching the set B is
maximized, and the constraints in (20c) represent the balance
between the “inflow” to and “outflow” from states.
Let υ? be the optimal value of the LP in (20a)-(20d). Next,
we solve the LP
minimize
x(s,a)
∑
s∈Sr
∑
a∈A
x(s, a) (21a)
subject to:
∑
s∈Sr
∑
a∈A
x(s, a)φ(s, a) = υ
? (21b)
(20b)− (20d). (21c)
Let {x?(s, a):s∈S, a∈A} be a set of optimal decision variables
for the problem in (21a)-(21c). Moreover, for a given state
s∈S, let A?(s):={a∈A(s) : x?(s, a)>0} be the set of active
actions. An optimal stationary policy pi? that satisfies the
condition in (17) can be generated from this set as
pi?(s) = a for an arbitrary a ∈ A?(s). (22)
Proposition 1: A stationary policy generated from the optimal
decision variables x?(s, a) using the rule in (22) is a solution
to the problem in (19a)-(19b).
A proof of Proposition 1 can be found in [16]. Intuitively,
the LP in (21a)-(21c) computes the minimum expected time
to reach the set B with probability Rmax(M, B) and cost
υ?. Therefore, if x?(s, a)>0, by taking the action a∈A(s),
the agent has to “get closer” to the set B with nonzero
probability. Otherwise, the minimum expected time to reach
the set B would be strictly decreased. Hence, by choosing an
action a∈A?(s), the agent reaches the set B with maximum
probability at minimum total cost.
VIII. ALGORITHMS FOR BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION
In this section, we present two algorithms to solve the
N-BMP. In Appendix C, we explain how to modify these
algorithms to solve the NS-BMP.
A. Computing a globally optimal solution to the N-BMP
We formulate a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) to
compute a globally optimal solution to the N-BMP. Recall
that in the N-BMP, the objective is to synthesize a stationary
incentive sequence γ∈ΓS(M) under which the agent reaches
the target set B with probability Rmax(M, B) regardless of its
type and the expected total cost to the principal is minimized.
We present the MILP formulated to obtain an -optimal
stationary incentive sequence for the N-BMP in (23a)-(23n).
In what follows, we explain its derivation in detail. Recall
from Section VII-B that it is sufficient for the principal to
incentivize the agent only from the states Sr⊆S in order to
induce the desired behavior. Hence, we focus only on the set
Sr of states in the MILP formulation.
We first express the optimal behavior of an agent type
θ, i.e., the constraints in (2b)-(2c), as a set of inequality
constraints. Let {γ(s, a)≥0 | s∈Sr, a∈A} be a set of variables
representing the incentive offers. For each θ∈Θ, s∈Sr, and
a∈A(s), let Vθ(s)∈R and Qθ(s, a)∈R be variables such that
Qθ(s, a) = Rθ(s, a) + γ(s, a), (24a)
Vθ(s) = max
a∈A(s)
Qθ(s, a). (24b)
Then, for a given state s∈Sr, any action a∈A(s) that sat-
isfies Vθ(s)=Qθ(s, a) is optimal for the agent type θ. Let
{Xθs,a∈{0, 1} | s∈Sr, a∈A, θ∈Θ} be a set of binary variables
representing whether an action a∈A(s) is optimal for the agent
type θ, i.e., Xθs,a=1. The constraint in (24b) is not linear
in Qθ(s, a); however, using the big-M method [30], we can
replace (24b) exactly by the following set of inequalities
Vθ(s) ≥ Qθ(s, a) ∀a ∈ A(s), (25a)
Vθ(s) ≤ Qθ(s, a) + (1−Xθs,a)M ∀a ∈ A(s), (25b)∑
a∈A(s)
Xθs,a ≥ 1 (25c)
where M is a large constant which will be specified shortly.
In particular, the constant M is chosen such that if Xθs,a=0,
then the inequality in (25b) trivially holds. The constraints
described above correspond to the constraints in (23b)-(23d)
and (23n) in the formulated MILP.
Next, we introduce a set of inequality constraints which
ensure that the agent type θ has a unique optimal policy. For
each s∈Sr and a∈A(s), using the big-M method, we require
Qθ(s, a) + (1−Xθs,a)M ≥ Qθ(s, a′) +  (26)
for all a′∈A(s)\{a}, where the constant >0 is defined in
terms of the constant  as shown in Theorem 5. Note that
if Xθs,a=1, then Qθ(s, a)>Qθ(s, a′) for all a′∈A(s)\{a}.
Hence, the unique optimal policy of the agent type θ satisfies
pi?(s)=a. Again, the choice of M guarantees that if Xθs,a=0,
then the inequality in (26) trivially hold. These constraints
correspond to the constraints (23e) in the formulated MILP.
We now express the reachability constraint in (2d) as a set
of equality constraints. Recall from (19b) that the constraint in
(2d) can be written as an expected total reward constraint with
respect to the reward function r defined in (18). In particular,
the constraint in (20b), together with the constraints in (20c)-
(20d), ensures that the agent reaches the target set B with
maximum probability. For each θ∈Θ, s∈Sr, and a∈A(s), let
µr,θ(s, a)∈R and λr,θ(s, a)∈R≥0 be variables such that∑
a∈A(s)
µr,θ(s, a)−
∑
s′∈Sr
∑
a∈A(s′)
µr,θ(s
′, a) = α(s), (27a)
∑
s∈Sr
∑
a∈A(s)
λr,θ(s, a)r(s, a) = Rmax(M, B), (27b)
µr,θ(s, a) = λr,θ(s, a)X
θ
s,a (27c)
where the function α:S→{0, 1} represents the initial state
distribution. Using the principle of optimality [8], one can
show that, from the initial state s1∈S, the agent type θ reaches
the target set B with probability Rmax(M, B) if and only if
the agent’s deterministic optimal policy expressed in terms of
the variables Xθs,a satisfies the constraints in (27a)-(27c).
The constraint in (27c) involves a multiplication of the
binary variable Xθs,a with the continuous variable λr,θ(s, a).
Using McCormick envelopes [31], we can replace each con-
straint in (27c) exactly by the following inequalities
µr,θ(s, a) ≥ 0, (28a)
µr,θ(s, a) ≤ M˜Xθs,a, (28b)
µr,θ(s, a) ≤ λr,θ(s, a) (28c)
µr,θ(s, a) ≥ λr,θ(s, a)− (1−Xθs,a)M˜. (28d)
The exact value of the large constant M˜ will be discussed
shortly. The above inequalities ensure that if Xθs,a=0, then
µr,θ(s, a)=0, and if Xθs,a=1, then µr,θ(s, a)=λr,θ(s, a). The
constraints described above are the constraints in (23f)-(23i).
We finally express the cost of behavior modification to the
principal, i.e., the objective function in (2a), with a set of
inequality constraints. For each θ∈Θ, s∈Sr, and a∈A(s), let
Vp,θ(s)∈R and Qp,θ(s, a)∈R be variables such that
Qp,θ(s, a) = γ(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
Ps,a,s′Vp,θ(s′), (29a)
Vp,θ(s) =
∑
a∈A(s)
Xθs,aQp,θ(s, a). (29b)
Using the principle of optimality, one can show that the
expected total amount of incentives paid to the agent type θ by
the principal is Vp,θ(s1) where s1∈S is the initial state ofM.
Hence, the principal’s objective is to find a stationary incentive
sequence that minimizes Vp,θ(s1) over all agent types θ∈Θ.
This objective is expressed in the formulated MILP with the
objective function in (23a) and the constraint in (23m).
The equality constraint in (29b) involves bilinear terms.
Using the big-M method, we can replace the constraint in
(29b) exactly by the following set of inequality constraints
Vp,θ(s) ≥ Qp,θ(s, a)− (1−Xθs,a)M  ∀a ∈ A(s), (30a)
Vp,θ(s) ≤ Qp,θ(s, a) + (1−Xθs,a)M  ∀a ∈ A(s), (30b)
where M  is a large constant which will be precisely specified
shortly. The above constraints ensure that if Xθs,a=1, we have
Vp,θ(s)=Qp,θ(s); otherwise, the corresponding inequalities
trivially hold. The constraints in (23k)-(23l) in the formulated
MILP then correspond to the constraints explained above.
minimize
ω,γ,Vθ,Vr,θ,
Vp,θ,Xθs,a,λr,θ
ω (23a)
subject to: ∀θ ∈ Θ,∀s ∈ Sr,∀a ∈ A(s), Qθ(s, a) = Rθ(s, a) + γ(s, a) (23b)
∀θ ∈ Θ,∀s ∈ Sr, Vθ(s) ≥ Qθ(s, a) ∀a ∈ A(s) (23c)
∀θ ∈ Θ,∀s ∈ Sr, Vθ(s) ≤ Qθ(s, a) + (1−Xθs,a)M ∀a ∈ A(s) (23d)
∀θ ∈ Θ,∀s ∈ Sr,∀a ∈ A(s), Qθ(s, a) + (1−Xθs,a)M ≥ Qθ(s, a′) +  ∀a′ ∈ A\{a} (23e)
∀θ ∈ Θ,∀s ∈ Sr,
∑
a∈A(s)
µr,θ(s, a)−
∑
s′∈Sr
∑
a∈A(s′)
µr,θ(s
′, a) = α(s), (23f)
∀θ ∈ Θ,
∑
s∈Sr
∑
a∈A(s)
λr,θ(s, a)r(s, a) = Rmax(M, B), (23g)
∀θ ∈ Θ,∀s ∈ Sr,∀a ∈ A(s), µr,θ(s, a) ≥ 0, µr,θ(s, a) ≤ M˜Xθs,a, µr,θ(s, a) ≤ λr,θ(s, a) (23h)
∀θ ∈ Θ,∀s ∈ Sr,∀a ∈ A(s), µr,θ(s, a) ≥ λr,θ(s, a)− (1−Xθs,a)M˜ (23i)
∀θ ∈ Θ,∀s ∈ Sr,∀a ∈ A(s), Qp,θ(s, a) = γ(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
Ps,a,s′Vp,θ(s′), (23j)
∀θ ∈ Θ,∀s ∈ Sr, Vp,θ(s) ≥ Qp,θ(s, a)− (1−Xθs,a)M  ∀a ∈ A(s), (23k)
∀θ ∈ Θ,∀s ∈ Sr, Vp,θ(s) ≤ Qp,θ(s, a) + (1−Xθs,a)M  ∀a ∈ A(s), (23l)
∀θ ∈ Θ, ω ≥ Vp,θ(s1) (23m)
∀θ ∈ Θ,∀s ∈ Sr,∀a ∈ A(s) γ(s, a) ≥ 0, λr,θ(s, a) ≥ 0, Xθs,a ∈ {0, 1},
∑
a∈A(s)
Xθs,a ≥ 1. (23n)
The formulation of the MILP (23a)-(23n) involves only
the exact representation of the problem in (2a)-(2d) and the
constraint in (26) which ensures that each agent type has a
unique optimal policy. Therefore, it follows from Theorem
5 that an -optimal solution to the N-BMP can be obtained
from the optimal solution to the formulated MILP by using
its optimal decision variables γ?(s, a) as the incentive offers.
Choosing the big-M constants: The formulation of the MILP
(23a)-(23n) requires one to specify the constants M, M˜ , and
M . They should be chosen such that the constraints involving
them hold trivially when the binary variable Xθs,a=0.
The constant M appears in (23d) and (23e). We set
M := 2
(
max
θ∈Θ,s∈S,a∈A
Rθ(s, a)− min
θ∈Θ,s∈S,a∈A
Rθ(s, a) + 
)
.
The rationale behind this choice is quite simple. For a
given state s∈Sr, the principal can make any action a∈A(s)
uniquely optimal for any agent type θ∈Θ by offering an
incentive γ(s, a)≤maxRθ(s, a)−minRθ(s, a)+. Hence, we
have Qθ(s, a) −Qθ(s, a′)≤M for any θ∈Θ, any s∈Sr, and
any a, a′∈A(s). Consequently, for the above choice of M, the
constraints in (23d) and (23e) hold trivially when Xθs,a=0.
The constant M˜ appears in (23h)-(23i). These constraints
put upper bounds on the expected residence times in state-
action pairs. For MDPs with deterministic transition functions,
we simply set M˜=1. The reason is that, under a deterministic
policy that reaches the set B with maximum probability, the
agent cannot visit a state s∈Sr twice. On the other hand, for
MDPs with stochastic transition functions, it is, in general,
NP-hard to compute the maximum expected residence times in
states subject to the reachability constraint in (2d). Therefore,
in that case, we set M˜=k|S| for some large k∈N.
The constant M  appears in (30a)-(30b). These constraints
put bounds on the total expected cost Vp,θ(s) to the prin-
cipal. Using the methods described in Section VII-C, one
can compute a policy that minimizes the expected total cost
with respect to the cost function C, defined in (3), subject to
the reachability constraint in (2d). The optimal value of this
optimization problem corresponds to a total incentive amount
that is sufficient to lead the agent to the target set regardless of
its type. Hence, it provides an upper bound on the variables
Qp,θ(s, a). We set the constant M  to the optimal value of
the above mentioned optimization problem. As a result, the
constraints in (30a)-(30b) hold trivially when Xθs,a=0.
B. Computing a locally optimal solution to the N-BMP
The MILP formulation described in the previous section
involves |S||A||Θ| binary variables. In the worst case, com-
puting its optimal solution takes exponential time in the size
of M and Θ. Here, we present a more practical algorithm
which computes a locally optimal solution to the N-BMP.
Specifically, we formulate the N-BMP as a nonlinear opti-
mization problem (NLP) with bilinear constraints by slightly
modifying the MILP (23a)-(23n). We then use the so-called
convex-concave procedure (CCP) to solve the derived NLP.
To formulate the N-BMP as an NLP with bilinar constraints
instead of an MILP, we express the policy of the agent type
θ using the set of continuous variables{
0 ≤ νθ(s, a) ≤ 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
a∈A(s)
νθ(s, a) = 1, s ∈ Sr, a ∈ A, θ ∈ Θ
}
instead of the binary variables Xθs,a∈{0, 1}. In what follows,
we explain the modifications we make to the MILP (23a)-(23n)
to obtain an NLP with bilinear constraints.
To express the optimal behavior of an agent type θ, we keep
the constraints (23b)-(23c), but replace the constraint in (23d)
in the MILP with the following constraint
Vθ(s) ≤
∑
a∈A(s)
νθ(s, a)Qθ(s, a). (31)
The above inequality, together with (23b)-(23c), ensures that
if νθ(s, a)>0, the corresponding action a∈A(s) is optimal
for the agent type θ. Note that the condition νθ(s, a)>0 is
not necessary for the action a∈A(s) to be optimal. Next, we
introduce a constraint which ensures that the agent type θ has
a unique deterministic optimal policy; therefore, the condition
νθ(s, a)>0 becomes a necessary and sufficient condition for
the optimality of the action a∈A(s) for the agent type θ.
Now, similar to (26), we introduce a set of inequality
constraints which ensure that the agent type θ has a unique
optimal policy. In particular, we replace the constraints in
(23e) in the MILP with the following set of constraints
νθ(s, a)
[
Qθ(s, a)−
(
Qθ(s, a′) + 
)]
≥ 0 (32)
for all a′∈A(s)\{a}. The above constraints, together with the
constraints in (23b)-(23c) and (31), ensure that νθ(s, a)=1 for
the uniquely optimal action a∈A(s).
In the MILP formulation, we express the reachability con-
straint in (2d) as the set of constraints in (23f)-(23i). In partic-
ular, the constraints in (28a)-(28d) represent the McCormick
envelope corresponding to the constraint in (27c). In the NLP
formulation, we keep the constraints in (23f)-(23g), but instead
of using the McCormick envelopes, we replace the constraint
in (27c) simply with the following bilinear constraint
µr,θ(s, a) = λr,θ(s, a)ν
θ(s, a). (33)
The above constraint, together with the constraints in (23f)-
(23g), ensures that the agent type θ∈Θ reaches the target
set B with probability Rmax(M, B) under its optimal policy
expressed in terms of the variables νθ(s, a).
Finally, we express the expected total cost of behavior
modification with a set of inequality constraints. Specifically,
we keep the constraints in (23j) and (23m) in the MILP, but
replace the constraints in (23k)-(23l) with the constraint
Vp,θ(s) ≥
∑
a∈A(s)
νθ(s, a)Qp,θ(s, a). (34)
It is important to note that we removed the constraint that
puts an upper bound on the value of Vp,θ(s). As a result,
unlike the MILP (23a)-(23n), in the formulated optimization
problem, the value of Vp,θ(s1) is, in general, not equal to
the cost of behavior modification for the corresponding agent
type θ. However, it is indeed equal to the cost of behavior
modification for the agent type that maximizes the cost to the
principal, i.e., θ∈Θ that satisfies w=Vp,θ(s1).
The formulation of the NLP described above involves the
exact representation of the constraints in (2b)-(2d) and an
additional constraint in (32) which ensures that each agent type
has a unique optimal policy. Moreover, it exactly represents
the worst-case expected total cost incurred by the principal.
Hence, it follows from Theorem 5 that an -optimal solution
to the N-BMP can be obtained from the optimal solution to
the formulated NLP by using its optimal decision variables
γ?(s, a) as the incentive offers to the agent.
CCP to compute a local optimum: We employ the Penalty
CCP (P-CCP) algorithm [14], which is a variation of the basic
CCP algorithm [15], to compute a locally optimal solution to
the formulated NLP. We now briefly cover the main working
principles of the P-CCP algorithm and explain how to utilize
it for the purposes of this paper. We refer the interested reader
to [14] for further details on the P-CCP algorithm.
Suppose we are given an optimization problem of the form
minimize
x∈Rn
Z0(x) (35a)
subject to: Zi(x)− Yi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m (35b)
where Zi:Rn→R and Yi:Rn→R are convex functions for
each i∈{0, 1 . . . ,m}. The above optimization problem is, in
general, not convex due to the constraints in (35b) [26]. The
P-CCP algorithm is a heuristic method to compute a locally
optimal solution to the problems of the form (35a)-(35b) by
iteratively approximating the constraints in (35b).
Let ζ be a constant such that ζ>1, τ0 and τmax be positive
constants, and τk be a constant that is recursively defined as
τk:=min{ζτk−1, τmax} for k∈N. Note that τi≥τj for all i≥j.
Starting from an arbitrary initial point x0∈Rn, at the k-th
iteration, the P-CCP algorithm computes a globally optimal
solution xk+1 of the convex optimization problem
minimize
x∈Rn
Z0(x) + τk
m∑
i=1
ski (36a)
subject to: Zi(x)− Y i(x;xk) ≤ ski , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m (36b)
ski ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m (36c)
where Y i(x;xk):=Yi(xk)+∇Yi(xk)T (x−xk) is the first-
order approximation of the function Yi at xk, and ∇Yi denotes
the gradient of Yi. In the above problem, the variables ski
is referred to as the slack variables. This is because, when
the optimal solution to the problem in (36a)-(36c) satisfies
ski =0 for all i, then the optimal variables xk+1∈Rn constitute
a feasible solution for the original problem in (35a)-(35b).
The P-CCP algorithm terminates when(
Z0(xk) + τk
m∑
i=1
ski
)
−
(
Z0(xk+1) + τk
m∑
i=1
sk+1i
)
≤ δ
for some small δ>0, and either xk is feasible, i.e.,
m∑
i=1
sk+1i ≤ δviolation ≈ 0, (37)
or τk=τmax. The P-CCP algorithm is guaranteed to terminate
[14]. Moreover, if the condition in (37) is satisfied upon
termination, the output of the algorithm constitutes a locally
optimal solution to the problem in (35a)-(35b).
The NLP formulated in the previous section consists of a
convex objective function, i.e., Z0(x)=w, a number of linear
constraints, and the bilinear constraints in (31)-(34). To employ
the P-CCP algorithm for obtaining a locally optimal solution
to the formulated NLP, we express the above mentioned
bilinear constraints in the form of (35b) by following the
convexification technique described in [32]. Due to space
restrictions, we refer the interested reader to Section 5 in [32]
for further details on the convexification technique.
We can now compute a locally optimal solution to the
NLP formulated in the previous section as follows. Set the
parameters ζ, τ0, τmax, δ, and δviolation. Initialize the P-CCP
algorithm by setting all variables to some initial values. Run
the P-CCP algorithm by convexifying each bilinear term in the
NLP at each iteration. Upon termination, verify whether the
condition in (37) is satisfied. If it is satisfied, use the optimal
decision variables γ?(s, a) as the incentive offers to the agent.
IX. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We illustrate the application of the presented algorithms
with two examples on discount planning and motion planning.1
We run the computations on a 3.1 GHz desktop with 32 GB
RAM and employ the GUROBI solver [33] for optimization.
A. Discount planning to encourage purchases
We consider a retailer (principal) that aims to sell n products
to a customer (agent) at the end of n interactions. It is assumed
that the agent purchases a single product per interaction, and
the agent’s willingness to purchase new products depends on
the ones purchased in the past. The principal does not know
how the agent associates different products with each other and
aims to maximize its total profit by synthesizing a sequence
of discount offers (incentives) by convincing the agent to
purchase all the products with a minimum total discount.
Let Q={1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of products that the principal
aims to sell. We construct an MDP to express the agent’s
behavior as follows. Each state in the MDP corresponds to a
set of products that are already purchased by the agent, i.e.,
the set S of states is the power set of Q. The initial state of the
MDP is the empty set. In a given state s∈S such that s⊆Q,
the agent has two choices: not to make any purchases and
stay in the same state by taking the action a0 or to purchase a
product i∈Q\s by taking the action ai as a result of which it
transitions to the state s∪{i}∈S. All transitions in this model
are deterministic, i.e., Ps,a,s′∈{0, 1}.
We choose n=4 and consider 3 agent types, i.e., |Θ|=3.
All agent types prefer not to purchase any products unless the
principal offers some discounts, i.e., Rmaxθ (s)=Rθ(s, a0)=0
for all s∈S and θ∈Θ. The intrinsic motivation of each agent
type is summarized in Table II. The product grouping in
Table II expresses how an agent type associates the prod-
ucts with each other. For example, once the agent type θ1
purchases product 1, it becomes more willing to purchase
product 2 than products 3 or 4, i.e., Rθ1({1}, a2)=−1 and
Rθ1({1}, a3)=Rθ1({1}, a4)=−2. Once a group of products
1Due to space restrictions, we provide only a brief description of the
reward functions in numerical examples. We refer the interested readers
to https://github.com/yagizsavas/Sequential-Incentive-Design for a complete
description of reward functions and an implementation of the algorithms.
TABLE II: Customer preferences in discount planning.
Customer Type Product grouping Product importance
θ1 G1={1, 2}, G2={3, 4} G2>G1
θ2 G1={1, 3}, G2={2, 4} G2>G1
θ3 G1={1, 4}, G2={2, 3} G2=G1
is purchased by the agent, it becomes harder for the prin-
cipal to sell another group of products. The product im-
portance in Table II expresses the agent’s willingness to
purchase a group of products once the other group of prod-
ucts is already purchased. For example, it is more prof-
itable for the principal to sell first the group G1={1, 2}
of products to the type θ1 and then the group G2={3, 4}
of products since θ1 is already more willing to purchase
the group G2, i.e., Rθ1({1, 2}, a3)=Rθ1({1, 2}, a4)=−2 and
Rθ1({3, 4}, a1)=Rθ1({3, 4}, a2)=−3.
We synthesized a sequence of discount offers for the agent
by solving the corresponding MILP formulation which has
205 continuous and 112 binary variables. The computation
took 0.4 seconds. A part of the synthesized discount se-
quence is demonstrated in Table III. During the first in-
teraction, the principal offers a discount only for product
1. The offer is large enough to ensure that the agent pur-
chases product 1 regardless of its type, i.e., γ({}, a1)=1+.
Then, during the second interaction, the principal offers dis-
counts γ({1}, a2)=γ({1}, a3)=γ({1}, a4)=1+ for all re-
maining products. As a result, depending on its type, the agent
purchases one of the discounted products. For example, the
agent type θ1 purchases product 2, whereas the agent type θ2
purchases product 3. Finally, the principal sequentially offers
discounts for remaining two products.
The synthesized discount sequence utilizes the principal’s
knowledge on the possible agent types. Specifically, the prin-
cipal knows that purchasing product 1 is not a priority for
any of the agent types (see Table II). Therefore, the principal
is aware that it will be harder to sell product 1 once the
agent spends money on the other products. Hence, by offering
a discount only for product 1 during the first interaction,
the principal makes sure that the agent purchases the least
important product when it still has the money. Moreover,
during the second interaction, the principal ensures that each
agent type purchases the second least important product for
itself by offering discounts for products 2, 3, and 4 at the
same. Since the group of products that are not purchased yet
are more important than the group of products that are already
purchased, the principal then sells the remaining products by
offering small discount amounts.
B. Incentives for motion planning
We consider a ridesharing company (principal) that aims
to convince a driver (agent) to be present at a desired target
region during the rush hour by offering monetary incentives.
The company is assumed to operate in Austin, TX, USA which
is divided into regions according to zip codes as shown in
Fig. 2 (left) in which the areas, e.g., downtown, north etc., are
TABLE III: Discount offers that maximize the retailer’s profit
while ensuring that the customer purchases all products re-
gardless of its type. The check marks indicate the discounted
products as a function of the products that are already pur-
chased. For example, the retailer discounts only product 1 if
the customer has no previous purchases and discounts product
4 if the set {1, 2} of products has already been purchased.
Product
Purchased {} {1} {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4}
1 X - - - -
2 - X - - -
3 - X - - X
4 - X X X -
indicated with different colors for illustrative purposes. The
environment is modeled as an MDP with 54 states each of
which corresponds to a region. In state si∈S, the agent has
two choices: to stay in the same state si under the action ai or
to move to a “neighboring” state sj , i.e., a region that share
a border with the agent’s current region, under the action aj .
We consider three agent types, i.e., |Θ|=3. In the absence
of incentives, staying in the same state is optimal for all agent
types in all states, i.e., Rmaxθ (si)=Rθ(si, ai)=0 for all si∈S
and θ∈Θ. Hence, the principal cannot distinguish the true
agent type by passively observing the agent and, to induce
the desired behavior, the principal has to offer incentives in
all states. The first agent type θ1 associates each state pair
(si, sj) with their corresponding distance di,j . To move to a
different region, it demands the principal to offer incentives
that is proportional to di,j , i.e.,Rθ1(si, aj)=−di,j . The second
agent type θ2 associates each state si with a congestion index
ti∈{1, 2, . . . , 10}, e.g., the states in downtown area has the
highest congestion indices. To move to a region sj , it demands
the principal to offer incentives that is proportional to tj , i.e.,
Rθ2(si, aj)=−2tj . Finally, the third agent type θ3 takes both
the distance and congestion index into account and has the
reward function Rθ3(si, aj)=−(0.8di,j + 0.2tj).
We first considered the case of known agent types and
synthesized optimal incentive sequences for each agent type
using the corresponding LP formulation. Trajectories followed
by the agents under the synthesized incentive sequences are
shown in Fig. 2 (right) with dashed lines, e.g., the type θ1
is incentivized to follow the shortest trajectory to the target.
We then considered the case of unknown agent types and
computed a globally optimal solution to the corresponding N-
BMP instance using the MILP formulation. The MILP had
1407 continuous and 937 binary variables, and the compu-
tation exceeded the memory limit after 6 hours. Finally, we
computed a locally optimal solution to the corresponding N-
BMP instance through the NLP formulation which has 64801
continuous variables. The CCP converged in 193 iterations,
and the computation took 1543 seconds in total. Optimal
trajectories followed by each agent type under the synthesized
incentive sequence are shown in Fig. 2 (right) with solid lines.
We measured the suboptimality of the synthesized incentive
Fig. 2: Motion planning with incentive offers. The states with
labels S and T are the initial and target states, respectively.
Green, blue, and red lines are the trajectories followed by the
agent types θ1, θ2, and θ3, respectively. When the agent type
is unknown (known) to the principal, the solid (dashed) trajec-
tories are followed under the synthesized incentive sequence.
sequence using the lower bound in (8); the total cost of the
synthesized incentive sequence to the principal is at most 1.52
times the total cost of the globally optimal one.
As seen in Fig. 2, under the synthesized incentive sequence,
the agent reaches the target state desired by the principal
regardless of its type. Moreover, the synthesized incentive
sequence utilizes the principal’s information on possible agent
types. In particular, under the offered incentive sequences, the
agent types θ1 and θ2 follow trajectories that resemble the ones
that would be followed if the true agent type was known to the
principal. Moreover, even though the optimal trajectory of the
type θ3 changes significantly due to the principal’s incomplete
information on the true agent type, the type θ3 still avoids the
downtown area under the offered incentive sequences.
X. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We considered a principal that offers a sequence of incen-
tives to an agent with unknown intrinsic motivation to align
the agent’s behavior with a desired objective. We showed that
the behavior modification problem (BMP), the problem of
synthesizing an incentive sequence that induces the desired
behavior at minimum total cost is, in general, computationally
intractable. We presented a sufficient condition under which
the BMP can be solved in time polynomial in the related pa-
rameters. Finally, we developed two algorithms to synthesize a
stationary incentive sequence that induces the desired behavior
while minimizing the total cost either globally or locally.
In the BMP, we assume that the agent’s intrinsic motivation
can be expressed as a reward function that belongs to a finite
set of possible reward functions. The performance of any
algorithm that solves the BMP necessarily depends on the size
of this finite set. Hence, it is of interest to develop methods
that extract reward representations from data by taking the
computational complexity of the resulting BMP into account.
Another possible future direction is to express the agent’s
unknown intrinsic motivation as a generic function with certain
structural properties, e.g., continuity, monotonicity, concavity
etc., and investigate the effects of different properties on the
complexity of the resulting BMP.
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APPENDIX A
In this appendix, we briefly explain how to modify the
methods developed in this paper in order to solve the BMP
when the agent has a finite decision horizon N∈N and when
the set B⊆S of target states consists of non-absorbing states.
Consider an agent with a finite decision horizon N∈N
whose objective is to maximize the expected total reward it
collects at the end of every N stages [16]. Such an agent’s
optimal policy is a sequence (D1, D2, . . .) of decisions where,
for k∈N, Dk:=(d(k−1)N+1, d(k−1)N+2, . . . , dkN ) satisfies
Dk ∈ arg max
pi∈Π(M)
Epi
[
kN∑
t=(k−1)N+1
Rθ?(st, a) + δt(It, a)
]
.
We now show that the behavior modification of an
agent with a finite decision horizon N is computationally
not easier than the behavior modification of a myopic
agent. For any MDP M and N∈N, consider an expanded
MDP with the set S:=S×[N ] of states and the initial
state (s1, 1). Let the transition function P:S×A×S→[0, 1]
be such that P((s, t), a, (s, t+1))=1 for t∈[N ]\{N} and
P((s,N), a, (s′, 1))=Ps,a,s′ , and the reward function
Rθ? :S×A→R be such that Rθ?((s,N), a):=Rθ?(s, a) and
Rθ?((s, t), a):=0 otherwise. It can be shown that, on the
expanded MDP, the behavior modification of an agent with a
decision horizon N is equivalent to the behavior modification
of a myopic agent. Since the expanded MDP is constructed in
time polynomial in the size of M and N , the result follows.
One can solve the BMP when the agent has a decision
horizon N∈N as follows. For a given BMP instance, first
construct an MDP with the set S:=S×[N ] of states, the initial
state (s1, 1), and the transition function P:S×A×S→[0, 1]
such that P((s, t), a, (s′, t+1))=Ps,a,s′ for t∈[N ]\{N} and
P((s,N), a, (s′, 1))=Ps,a,s′ . Note that, in the above construc-
tion, the agent returns to a state (s, 1) where s∈S after every N
stages. Second, on the constructed MDP, synthesize a sequence
of incentive offers that solve the BMP. Finally, in every N
stages, provide the agent the next N incentive offers.
One can solve the BMP when the set B of target states
consists of non-absorbing states as follows. For a given BMP
instance, construct an MDP with the set S:=S×{1, 2} of
states, the initial state (s1, 1), and the transition function
P:S×A×S→[0, 1] such that P((s, 1), a, (s′, 1))=Ps,a,s′ for
all s∈S\B, P((s, 1), a, (s′, 2))=Ps,a,s′ for all s∈B, and
P((s, 2), a, (s′, 2))=Ps,a,s′ for all s∈S. On the constructed
MDP, the agent transitions to a state (s, 2)∈S×{2} if and only
if it reaches the target set. Make all states S×{2} absorbing
and replace the target set B with the set S×{2}. Finally, on
the constructed MDP, synthesize a sequence of incentive offers
that solve the BMP.
APPENDIX B
In this appendix, we provide proofs for all results presented
in this paper.
Definition 8: (QSAT) [22] Let F (x1, x2, . . . , xn) be a
Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form with three literals
per clause, and ∃x1∀x2∃x3 . . . ∀xnF (x1, x2, . . . , xn) be a
quantified Boolean formula (QBF). Decide whether the given
QBF is true.
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof is by a reduction from QSAT.
We are given an arbitrary QBF with n variables and m clauses
C1, C2, . . . , Cm. Without loss of generality, we assume that n
is an even number. To prove the claim, we first construct an
MDPM, a target set B⊆S, a type set Θ, and a reward function
Rθ for each θ∈Θ. We then show that, on the constructed
model, the total cost of an incentive sequence that solves the
BMP is n or less if and only if the QBF is true.
We first construct the MDP M. A graphical illustration of
the constructed MDP is given in Fig. 3. The set S of states
consists of 6n+2 states. That is, 6 states Ai, A′i, Ti, T
′
i , Fi, F
′
i
for each variable xi where i∈[n], and two additional states
An+1, A
′
n+1. The initial state s0 is the state A
′
1. The set A of
actions consists of 6 actions a0, a1, . . . , a5. The target set is
B={An+1}, and the type set is Θ={θ1, θ2, . . . , θm}.
Transition function P: We first define the transitions from
the states Ti, Fi, T ′i , F
′
i . From Ti, under the only available
action a3, the agent makes a deterministic transition to Ai+1.
From Fi, under the only available action a4, the agent makes a
deterministic transition to Ai+1. From T ′i , under the available
actions a3 and a4, the agent deterministically transitions,
respectively, to the states A′i+1 and Ai+1. Similarly, from F
′
i ,
under the available actions a3 and a4, the agent deterministi-
cally transitions, respectively, to the states A′i+1 and Ai+1.
Next, we define the transitions from the states Ai, A′i. From
Ai, if i∈[n] is even, the agent transitions to the states Ti and
Fi with equal probability under the only available action a5; if
i∈[n] is odd, the agent deterministically transitions to the states
Ai, Ti, and Fi, under the actions a0, a1, and a2, respectively.
Similarly, from A′i, if i∈[n] is even, the agent transitions to
the states T ′i and F
′
i with equal probability under the only
available action a5; if i∈[n] is odd, the agent deterministically
transitions to the states A′i, T
′
i , and F
′
i , under the actions a0,
a1, and a2, respectively. Finally, from the states An+1 and
A′n+1, the agent makes a self transition under the action a0.
Reward functions: The reward function Rθk where k∈[m]
is defined as follows. For s∈{Ai, A′i : i∈[n] is odd}, i.e., the
green states in Fig. 3, we haveRθk(s, a0)=0,Rθk(s, a1)=−1,
Rθk(s, a2)=−1. That is, the agent stays in the same state in
the absence of incentives, and to move the agent toward the
target state, the principal needs to offer the incentive of at least
1+ for a1 or a2, where >0 is an arbitrarily small constant.
We now define the reward function for the states T ′i , F
′
i .
This is the most important step in our construction since it
relates the agent type θk with the clause Ck. If the variable
xi appears positively in Ck 2, for s∈{T ′i : i∈[n]}, we have
Rθk(s, a3) = n+ 1, Rθk(s, a4) = 0,
2A variable xi is said to appear positively in a disjunction clause Ck if
Ck is true when xi is true; it is said to appear negatively in Ck if Ck is
true when xi is false; it is said to not appear in Ck if the truth value of Ck
is independent of the truth value of xi. For example, in C=x1 ∨ ¬x2, the
variable x1 appears positively, x2 appears negatively, and x3 does not appear.
and for s∈{F ′i : i∈[n]}, we have
Rθk(s, a3) = 0, Rθk(s, a4) = n+ 1.
On the other hand, if the variable xi appears negatively in
Ck, for s∈{T ′i : i∈[n]}, we have
Rθk(s, a3) = 0, Rθk(s, a4) = n+ 1,
and for s∈{F ′i : i∈[n]}, we have
Rθk(s, a3) = n+ 1, Rθk(s, a4) = 0.
Finally, if the variable xi does not appear in Ck, for s∈{T ′i :
i∈[n]}, we have
Rθk(s, a3) = 0, Rθk(s, a4) = n+ 1,
and for s∈{F ′i : i∈[n]}, we have
Rθk(s, a3) = 0, Rθk(s, a4) = n+ 1.
For all the other states and actions, we have Rθk(s, a) = 0.
We now show that an incentive sequence that leads the agent
to the target state An+1 with probability 1 at the worst-case
total cost n or less exists if and only if the QBF F is true.
Suppose first that the QBF F is true. Then, there is a
truth value assignment, i.e., true or false, for each existential
variable {xi : i ∈ [n] is odd}, such that under this assignment
all clauses Ck where k∈[m] are true. Then, on the constructed
MDP, from the states {A′i : i ∈ [n] is odd}, i.e., the green
states in Fig. 3, we can simply offer the following stationary
incentives to the agent: If xi is true, γ(A′i, a1)=2; if xi is
false γ(A′i, a2)=2. For all the other state-action pairs (t, a), we
offer γ(t, a)=0. Since the formula F is true, all the clauses Ck
must be true. Then, under the provided incentives, each type
θk must eventually transition to a state Ai with probability 1.
Since, from any state Ai, the agent reaches to the target state
An+1 with probability 1, the reachability constraint is satis-
fied. Moreover, the principal pays the incentives γ(A′i, a1)=2
exactly n/2 times; hence, the total cost to the principal is n.
Suppose that there exists an incentive sequence under which
the agent reaches the state An+1 with probability 1 at the
worst-case total cost n or less. Then, the optimal policy of
the agent under such an incentive sequence differs from its
optimal policy in the absence of incentives only in the states
{A′i : i∈[n] is odd}. The previous claim is true because
changing the optimal policy of the agent in states T ′i , F
′
i
requires the principal to offer at least an incentive amount
equal to n + 1. Note that all the agent types θk reaches the
target state with probability 1 under the provided incentive
sequence. Then, it must be true that the principal incentivizes
the actions a1 and/or a2 in states {A′i : i ∈ [n] is odd} such
that the agent eventually reaches a state Ai with probability
1 regardless of its type. We set the existential variable xi to
true if the principal incentives a1, and to false if the principal
incentivizes only a2. Recall that each clause Ck corresponds
to an agent type θk and the transition of an agent type θk to
a state Ai with probability 1 implies the clause Ck becoming
true. Consequently, since the agent reaches the state An+1
with probability 1 regardless of its type, under the described
truth value assignment, the formula F is evaluated true. 
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Fig. 3: An illustration of the MDP constructed to show that the BMP is PSPACE-hard. Solid lines represent deterministic
transitions; dashed lines represent transitions with equal probability. The states A′i, Ai represent the variables xi in the Boolean
formula F (x1, x2, . . . , xn). An existential variable xi is set to true (false) when the action a1 (a2) is incentivized from the
states A′i, Ai. A clause Ck becomes true when the agent type θk transitions to a state Ai with probability 1 under the incentive
offers. The formula F becomes true when the agent transitions to a state Ai with probability 1 regardless of its type.
Definition 9: (Euclidian path-TSP) [25] Given a set [N ] of
cities, distances ci,j∈N between each city pair (i, j) such that
ci,j=cj,i and ci,j+cj,k≥ci,k for all i, j, k∈[N ], and a constant
K∈N, decide whether there exists a path from the city 1 to
city N that visits all cities exactly once and the total traversed
distance is K or less.
Proof of Theorem 2: The decision problem is in NP because,
for a given stationary incentive sequence, we can compute the
occupancy measure [28] for the Markov chain induced by the
optimal stationary policy of each agent type in polynomial-
time via matrix inversion. The reachability probability and the
incurred total cost are linear functions of the occupancy mea-
sure [8]. Hence, the satisfaction of the reachability constraint
and the corresponding total cost incurred by the principal can
be verified in polynomial-time.
The NP-hardness proof is by a reduction from the Euclidian
path-TSP problem. We are given an arbitrary Euclidian path-
TSP problem instance. We first construct an MDP M. The
set of states is S={q1, q2, . . . , qN}, the initial state is q1,
and the set of actions is A={a1, a2, . . . , aN}. The transition
function P is such that, for states qi∈S\{qN}, Pqi,aj ,qj=1 for
all j∈{1, 2, . . . , N} and, the state qN∈S is absorbing.
The type set is Θ={θ1, θ2, . . . , θN−1}, and the target set is
B={qN}. The reward function Rθi for the type θi∈Θ is
Rθi(qj , ak) =

0 if j = k
−cj,k if j 6= k, j = i
−cj,k if j 6= k, j 6= i, k 6= N
−(K + 1) if j 6= k, j 6= i, k = N.
We claim that there exists a feasible solution to the con-
structed N-BMP with the objective value K or less if and
only if there exists a TSP path with total cost K or less.
Suppose that there exists a feasible solution to the N-BMP
with the objective value of K or less. Then, there exists an
incentive sequence under which at least one agent type visits
all states in S exactly once. Suppose for contradiction that
none of the agent types visits the state qi∈S and that the true
agent type is θ?=θi. Then, to convince the agent to reach the
target state qN , the principal must pay the incentive of (K+1)
for the action aN from at least one of the states q∈S\{qi},
because otherwise, the agent will never take the action aN
and reach the target state. Therefore, the optimal incentive
sequence incurs the total cost of at least (K+1), which raises
a contradiction. Moreover, the agent type θi cannot visit
the same state twice under a provided stationary incentive
sequence because otherwise the agent’s stationary optimal
policy violates the reachability constraint. Consequently, the
path followed by the agent type θi constitutes a solution to
the Euclidian path-TSP with the total cost K or less.
Consider a solution to the Euclidian path-TSP problem
which visits the states s1, s2, . . . , and sN in sequence, where
s1=q1 and sN=qN . The principal can construct a stationary
incentive sequence from this solution as follows. For all states
si where i∈[N ], offer the incentives γ(si, aN )=csi,sN+
and γ(si, asi+1)=csi,si+1+. Under the constructed incentive
sequence, each agent type θi∈Θ transitions to the target state
qN from the state qi. Moreover, the worst-case total cost to
the principal is equal to the cost of the Euclidian path-TSP
problem plus N, which can be made arbitrarily small. Hence,
the claim follows. 
Definition 10: (Set cover) [34] Given a set S, a collection
of subsets T ={Ti ⊆ S} such that ∪Ti∈T =S, and a positive
integer M , decide whether there exists a subcollection U⊆T
of size M or less, i.e., |U|≤M , that covers S, i.e., ∪Ti∈U=S.
Proof of Theorem 3: The decision problem can be shown
to be in NP using the same method presented in Theorem
2. The NP-hardness proof is by a reduction from the set
cover problem. We are given an arbitrary set cover problem
instance in which S={1, 2, . . . , N} and T ={T1, T2, . . . , TK}
such that M≤K. To prove the claim, we construct an MDP
M, a target set B⊆S, a type set Θ, and a state-independent
reward function Rθ for each θ∈Θ. Then, we show that, on
the constructed model, the total cost of an incentive sequence
that solves the NS-BMP is M or less if and only if |U|≤M .
The MDPM has M+2 states, i.e., S={q1, q2, . . . , qM+2},
and K+1 actions, i.e.,A={a0, a1, . . . , aK}. The initial state is
q1. From the states qi where i∈[M−1], the agent transitions to
the state qi+1 under the action a0, and to the state qM+1 under
all the other actions. From the state qM , the agent transitions
to the state qM+2 under the action a0, and to qM+1 under all
the other actions. The states qM+1 and qM+2 are absorbing.
We define B={qM+1} and Θ={θ1, θ2, . . . , θN}. Finally,
the state-independent reward function Rθi is defined as
Rθi(q, aj) =

0 if j = 0
−1/2 if i ∈ Tj
−(K + 1) otherwise.
Note that, in the absence of incentives, the agent reaches the
absorbing state qM+2 with probability 1 regardless of its type.
Suppose there exists a collection of subsets U⊆T of size
M or less such that ∪Ti∈U=S. Without loss of generality,
assume that U={T1, T2, . . . , TL} where L≤M . Consider the
following stationary deterministic incentive sequence
γ(qi, aj) =
{
1 if i = j
0 otherwise.
Under the incentive sequence given above, an agent type θi
transitions to the state qM+1 from a state qk where k∈[M ] if
i∈∪Tj∈U . Since ∪Tj∈U=S, all agent types transitions to the
target state qM+1 with probability 1. Moreover, the total cost
to the principal is clearly less than or equal to M .
Suppose there exists a stationary deterministic incentive se-
quence that leads the agent to the target state qM+1 regardless
of its type at the total cost of M or less. Then, the incentive
sequence is such that, the agent type θi where i∈Tj transitions
to the target state qM+1 from a state qk where k∈[M ] if
the action aj is incentivized from that state. Since the agent
reaches the target state regardless of its type, the collection
of subsets Tj that corresponds to the incentivized actions aj
constitutes a set cover. Because the incentives are provided
only from the states qk where k∈[M ], the size of the resulting
set cover is less than or equal to M . 
Proof of Theorem 4: For a given incentive sequence
γ∈ΓR,θd(M), let pi?=(d?1, d?2, . . .) be the optimal policy of
the agent type θd and γ∈Γ(M) be an incentive sequence
γ(It, a) =
{
γ(It, a) if d?t (s) = a
0 otherwise.
(38)
Note that Rθd(s, a)+γ(It, a) ≥ maxa′∈A(s)Rθd(s, a′) for
d?t (s)=a and γ∈ΓR,θd(M). The condition stated in the the-
orem implies that Rθ(s, a)+γ(It, a) ≥ maxa′∈A(s)Rθ(s, a′)
for any θ∈Θ. Hence, we have γ∈ΓR,Θ(M), which implies
that ΓR,Θ(M)⊆ΓR,θd(M). Since, ΓR,θd(M)⊆ΓR,Θ(M) by
definition, we conclude that ΓR,Θ(M)=ΓR,θd(M).
Now, for any given incentive sequence γ∈ΓR,Θ(M), let
pi?=(d?1, d
?
2, . . .) be the optimal policy of the agent type θd
and γ∈Γ(M) be an incentive sequence defined as in (38). If
the condition stated in the theorem holds, then we have
max
θ∈Θ
f(γ, θ) = f(γ, θd).
Using the identity ΓR,Θ(M)=ΓR,θd(M), we conclude that
min
γ∈ΓR,Θ(M)
max
θ∈Θ
f(γ, θ) = min
γ∈ΓR,θd (M)
f(γ, θd). 
APPENDIX C
In this appendix, we show how to modify the algorithms
presented in Section VIII in order to compute globally and
locally optimal solutions to the NS-BMP.
Let {Xs,a∈{0, 1} : s∈Sr, a∈A,
∑
a∈AXs,a=1} be a set of
binary variables. One can obtain a globally optimal solution
to the NS-BMP by adding the constraints∑
a∈A
Xs,aγ(s, a) =
∑
a∈A
γ(s, a) for all s∈Sr (39)
to the MILP (23a)-(23n) and solving the resulting optimization
problem. Note that the above constraint is not linear in the
variables γ(s, a); however, each term Xs,aγ(s, a) can be
replaced exactly by its corresponding McCormick envelope
in order to obtain an MILP formulation for the NS-BMP.
Let {νs,a≥0 : s∈Sr, a∈A,
∑
a∈A νs,a=1} be a set of
continous variables. One can obtain a locally optimal solution
to the NS-BMP by adding the constraints∑
a∈A
νs,aγ(s, a) ≥
∑
a∈A
γ(s, a) for all s∈Sr (40)
to the NLP formulated in Section VIII-B and solving the
resulting optimization problem by resorting to the CCP.
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